Introduction
In the previous chapter, we have seen that Marx's thesis that the freedom of the person in the free market is ideological is not contradicted if the free market is understood in accordance with Hegel's model of the System of Needs. The free market seems to generate a form of wage labor which is not free. Moreover, Hegel shows that labor, insofar as it is not wage labor but qualitatively determined intellectual labor, cannot be understood within the framework of the System of Needs: it is necessary to make the transition to a conception of the good life. This means not only that the freedom of the person cannot be realized if the System of Needs is posited towards itself, but also that it still has to be investigated as to whether it is at all possible to execute the transition to the institutions in which the good life acquires shape. The tradition which stands for the good life seems to precisely hinder the possibility of real freedom.
Before we investigate how the transition to the good life is related to the realization of the freedom of free and equal persons, the extent to which Hegel's conception of the System of Needs contradicts the real realization of the person's freedom will be discussed. Is Marx not correct when he states that the free market must be overcome in the free society? Is the System of Needs conceivable without wage labor's lack of freedom? What must be said about the corporations in the light of Marx's criticism? How can corporations which are tied to tradition rescue the freedom of the person? Are corporations at all compatible with the free market? If so, what is the contemporary meaning of these kinds of corporations? Have they anything to do with the economic reality of our time?
The System of Needs as an Institution in Service of the Realization of Freedom
We have observed that the System of Needs has a particular status. In contrast to Marx's analysis of Capital, it is not a model in which the reality of capitalist society must be conceptualized. Hegel rather tries to introduce the System of Needs as an ideal-typical reconstruction of the economic system as he observes it in his time. More concretely, Hegel asks himself whether he can identify a contemporary institution which can be understood as the concrete unity of the second moment of Abstract Right (Vertrag) and the second moment of Morality (Absicht und Wohl). The conception of the System of Needs follows from the attempt to consider existing institutions as exemplifications of this concrete unity to a greater or lesser extent. In the System of Needs, these existing institutions are recaptured in an ideal-typical form: they only become part of the Philosophy of Right insofar as they correspond to the normative ideal of the concrete unity of Vertrag and Absicht und Wohl. This means that Hegel provides an instrument to immanently criticize his conception of the System of Needs. Insofar as the System of Needs cannot be understood as the concrete unity of Vertrag and Absicht und Wohl, it must be rejected as an institution in the service of the adequate realization of freedom.
We have seen that it takes no effort to understand the System of Needs as an institution in which the person of Abstract Right enters a contract as a real person. Therefore, the System of Needs is satisfactory if the question which is at stake is whether it observes the normative criterion of Abstract Right. The problems arose when we investigated whether the System of Needs could also be understood as the realization of Absicht und Wohl. Firstly, we concluded that the particular welfare of wage labor was not realized. The question then arises, on the one hand, as to whether the System of Needs necessarily generates wage labor or whether a System of Needs without wage labor is also conceivable. On the other hand, the question arises as to whether it is necessary, if the System of Needs does in fact generate wage labor, that the particular welfare of wage labor would not be realized. Secondly, we observed that intellectual labor also cannot realize free exchange in the System of Needs. After all, real exchange is tied to a community of value which cannot be situated in the System of Needs. The question, then, is not only whether the further development of freedom, by positing a community of value alongside the System of Needs, can lead to an adequate realization of freedom, but also whether Hegel's specific elaboration of the community of value is adequate. This is not only a systematic problem, but also a historical one, for the community of value has to be determined in such a way that it can acquire legitimacy as the ideal-typical reconstruction of the community of value known in Hegel's (or in our) time.
Wage Labor and the Realization of Particular Welfare
Insofar as wage laborers sell their labor force for a price which does not enable them to buy the goods necessary for their basic provision, this contract can
